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It’s a privilege to see the various seg …

July 17, 09 //
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It’s a privilege to see the various segments of Chinese society colliding against each other in Shanghai, but once you get past their differences, you begin to focus on
their commonalities–you begin to notice the way people talk, their inflections, their slang, the content of their conversations, the things they choose to emphasize.
ANd you realize, not surprisingly, that it’s an overwhelmingly utilitarian and mundane world, and that people aren’t debating poetry and philosophy and politics on the morning commute to work.

The reason why it seems I am belaboring the point is because although i was aware of this, I don’t suppose I ever gave up the hope somewhere in my heart of hearts, that things would be different somewhere else, and that people that would understand and empathize with all my intellectual and artistic yearnings would somehow pop up out of the woodwork, as if they’d been hiding behind the curtains at my
surprise birthday party, yell surprise and then somehow be there, to stay, always with me, thereby creating some kind of cocoon within which
I could completely function. This would be, in other words, some kind of nurturing atmosphere, much like what I had at home, with my parents.
Put in that light, it’s going to be hard for me to truly find a place in this world. IT’s not only about me carving out a niche for myself, but somehow creating
and maintaining that kind of environment. YOu look at people here and the first thing are immediately overwhelmed by the sheer incommensurability
of your ideals–despite everyone being human, wanting happiness, etc. There is a just a sheer abyss, and that’s because the tendencies of any artist or intellectual
is towards greater individuation–and although this isn’t necessarily the case, it is quite often the case that there is collateral damage. The damage is you:
the alienation between you and the great mass of people that don’t share our intellectual or artistic proclivities. It takes some work to reacquire that
familiarity, that sense of belongingness with people. The great mass of people never quite lose it, because there are no forces within them that would
necessarily make them stray far from that cultural, psychological orbit. But the centrifugal forces that threaten people like are always going to threaten to
take us farther from the crowd. Colin Wilson’s “outsider”–is not going to simply, through sheer, brute force exercise of the will, change his status, reverse his fortunes
and somehow devolve or de-evolve into what he was not. The process, in some way, is irreversible. And here you get into Ernest Becker territory
because what you will find is that the artist’s attempt to find an inch of ground on which to stand outside society is doomed to failure: not because society is
all encompassing or powerful, but because the attempt itself contains a structural, inherent flaw: it comes from you, the individual. It presumes that you can somehow
become a god in your right and destroy part of the world (in your imagination, hopefully) and rebuild it in your image. And according to Becker that is going to fail.
One therefore simply has to find a consciousness that is higher: the point is that the artist has to climb to the heights that only artists can reach
only to crash back down to earth: and then from there, he must climb back up again, but this time, not just as artist, or artist-hero, but as mystic, artist, hero, and animal–all
rolled into one. And then, and perhaps only then, is there going to be any shot at redemption, some kind of peace that is something deeper than what a few minutes of meditation or yoga practice or anger management will ever give you.

More hating on Jackie Chan

April 26, 09 //
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Blogger Hu Xingdou calls for a boycott of the Jackie Chan’s May 1st Beijing concert in light of Chan’s controversial comments about Chinese people and their need to be regulated or controlled. In some way i am sympathetic to Chan, because an intellectual he’s not and he really doesn’t have either the brains or the position to speak his real mind about things, and yet he was stupid enough to open his big mouth anyway. Oh well. Here are the last two paragraphs of this blogger’s criticism, which I liked and have translated for your edification.

成龙公然为剥夺人民群众的话语权、知情权、上访权、参与权撑腰。他在香港、台湾受到狗仔队的追踪，不胜其扰，由此他当然十分感激在大陆作为“中国电影家协会副主席”享受的副部级待遇与特别保护，“慢慢觉得”很有必要“管”一下举报腐败、维权上访、追求国家正义与自由的“添乱之人”，认为只有这样国家才很“和谐”。但是我要问的是：如果成龙的亲人遭遇冤屈无法伸张，如果成龙受到打击伤害无处讲理，如果成龙家的房子土地被人强征而没有什么补偿，如果成龙是弱势群体，不能享有经济权利、社会权利、文化权利、政治权利，举报腐败会被迫害，网络揭露地方乱象会被千里抓捕，上访会被送进精神病院，他还会这样嚣张与猖狂吗？当然，这些仅仅是假设，他成龙事实上是强势群体，是权贵，是既得利益者，他在大陆以爱国主义、民族主义的歌曲作伪装，日进斗金，实际上是在歌唱强者对弱者的蹂躏。
一位缺乏最起码公民意识的影星居然成为成千上万民众崇拜的偶像、成为中国人的“代表”，一位奴才的丑陋表演竟然赢得台下工商领袖们的热烈掌声，大陆中国人该反省一下了，该加入到抵制成龙的行列中去了——为了捍卫大陆的自由、香港的自由、台湾的自由。

[Jackie Chan has openly joined the forces of those that would deprive the people of their right to speak, to know (i.e. to have information), and to petition. Since he’s always getting hounded by the papparazzi in Hong Kong, he must really enjoy the special treatment that he receives as vice chairman of the CHina Film Association, and thus gradually has come to believe that it must be better to control all the troublemakers that report corruption, defend their rights through petitioning, or attempt to achieve some kind of justice, because only then can society be “harmonious”. But there’s something I’d like to ask: if it was his family that were wronged or the victims of injustice, and if it was them who had nowhere to seek redress, and if it was him that had his home and property forcibly taken away without any recompense, and if he was a member of a disadvantaged group, that didn’t have much by way of economic, social, cultural, or political power, and was attacked for reporting corruption or arrested for exposing the crimes of local governments, or taken into an insane asylum because he went to petition, would he still be this arrogant? Of course, these are just assumptions, because in reality Jackie Chan is one of the privileged few, a member of the social elite, the establishment and its vested interests–and he comes to mainland China, singing songs of nationalism and pride, making money hand over fist–but what he’s really singing are songs that celebrate the triumph of the strong over the weak.

That a celebrity who lacks a basic understanding of civil society and the rights of citizens could become the idol of millions, and “represent” China, that a slave’s shoddy performances could so delight and entertain the captains of industry and business leaders ought to give pause to all the Chinese people and make them reflect on whether they should join the ranks of those who will boycott Jackie Chan–for the sake protecting the freedoms of the PRC, the freedoms of Hong Kong, and the freedoms of Taiwan.

Translated interviews from the authors of Unhappy China (中国不高兴）

April 21, 09 //
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（4）中国想真正成为超级强国，首要的条件是不是军事的强大？造航母是不是我们成为强国的一种指标？
Is being a military power a necessary condition to China becoming a superpower? And would be making aircrafit carriers be a benchmark of that?

　　那不是首要条件，但肯定是不可缺少的一环。一个超级强国，经济上要很强大，话说过来，经济上不强大军事上也强大不起来。科技上也要非常先进，这个世界上应该是科技创新层出不穷的，但我们确实就差得很远。在文化上面也要有影响力，这点美国就有这个架子，不管好莱坞大片水平高低，全世界人民都在看，我们就需要这样的东西。但我认为，文化的东西可以放在后面一点，但经济科技军事肯定是少不了的。

No, that isn’t a sufficient condition, but it is definitely necessary. A superpower has to have economic strength, and you could say that without economic strength you could never develop economic strength. You also need to advanced in scientific research, although there are scientific and technological innovations in the world, in this regard we still lag behind. In terms of culture, we also need to have influence, and America has this trick down, no matter how good or bad Hollywood’s films are, people around the world will still watch them; we need something akin to that. However, I believe that we can put these cultural things on the backburner a bit, but economic and military strength are things we simply cannot do without.
　　
造航母不够成为强国的指标。泰国都有航母，印尼马上要造，应该说我们不造是比较可笑的。联合国常任理事国里面就我们没有，像英法，现在都不敢说自己是世界强国了，尽管都有航母呢。但说回来这个东西不是一个世界强国的指标，但如果没有这个东西，那肯定就不是世界强国。
That said, having an aircraft carrier is not a sufficient benchmark for military strength. Thailand has them, Indonesia is going to build some soon, you might say that it would be a joke if we didn’t have our own. Out of all the countries in the Security Council, we are the only country without any. England, France, they might not be superpowers anymore, but they still have carriers. Again, they are not sufficient conditions for saying a country is a superpower, but are necessary—you could not imagine a superpower that didn’t have them.

　　（5）金融危机给中国带来的警示意义是什么？未来中国进行坚定不移的产业升级是不是有效抵御经济动荡的最有效手段？
What kind of warning has the current financial crisis sounded for China. Will China’s commitment to increased productivity be enough to counter the current instabilities?

　　最大的警示意义，就是“搞金融是最高级的”这个观念是错误的，中国这次之所以受到的冲击比较小，就是因为金融方面比较落后，落后反而占了便宜。这次金融危机告诉我们制造业永远是最重要的，郎咸平所谓的“中国实体经济受到的冲击会更大，美国只是被冲击了一个金融”屁话，你看看通用汽车现在啥样了？当时跟工商银行差不多的花旗银行，现在市值是工商银行的二十分之一。还有，到华尔街抄什么底？要抄也要去底特律去西雅图，我们要工程师而不是那些所谓的金融人才。美国赌场现在出了大问题，以后赌场肯定就没有啦，他们做的那些特殊金融产品，等金融恢复了之后肯定不再有了，美国人也在反省，他们会取消掉这些特殊金融产品，那些金融人才都是废物，中国人干嘛要去招聘这些废物加骗子回来？

The greatest warning to us is that “doing finance is a higher form of economic activity” isn’t necessarily true. This time around, the impact on China has been relatively small, and that’s precisely because we, in terms of financial markets, behind the rest of the world. And that has redounded to our benefit. The crisis has demonstrated that manufacturing is still the most important, and Larry Lang’s argument that “China’s manufacturing and product industries will get hit hard, while only the financial industry will suffer in America” is clearly bullshit—have you seen what kind of shape GM is in? Citibank, which used to have market valuation close to that of the Commerce and Industry bank, is now only worth 1/20th of that. Also, why are we going to Wall Street to find people? If we are going to find some talented people we might as well go to Detroit or Seattle, what we need are engineers and not these so called financial wizards. The American “casino” has encountered some major problems, and in the future, they might just eliminate many of the financial products and instruments from this casino, so that when the financial system recovers, all these financial wizards are going to be useless, and if that’s the case, what would China want with them?

　　不能说单指望这一项，经济问题很复杂，但是对于中国最重要的，显然是产业升级。
You can’t simply hope for one aspect to improve, economic questions are quite complex, but what is most important for China is to improve its manufacturing capabilities.

　　（6）“解放军跟着中国核心利益走”，索马里护航是不是就是体现了这样一种主张？
The PLA will always follow China’s vital interests—does the protection of Chinese ships in Somalia prove this point?

　　这是很小的一个体现。虽然很多人批评索马里护航这件事，但起码有象征意义，起码对这三艘船是个锻炼，不经过实践，你的问题是不知道的。像宋晓军说的，你的钢板是不是适合远洋的需要，那得开出去试试才能知道。
This is only a small example of that. Even though many have criticized the Somali naval protection incident, it at least has some kind of symbolic value, and at least was some kind of training for those three ships, because without that kind of experience and training, you will never know where the real problems lie. It’s like Song Xiaojun said, you won’t know if your ships are fit for distant seas until you take it out and test it.

　　（7）绵延数十年的逆向种族主义将会对一个国家的精神品质造成什么样的伤害？我们应该如何阻止其滋长和蔓延？
What kind of impact does ten plus years of reverse racism have on the intellectual or cultural life of a nation? And what can we do to stop it?

　　伤害特别大。从国家来说，是国民不团结，愿意为外国人效忠。从个人说，到了外国之后，觉得自己不是个人。比如说女孩子，相信外国人特别好，嫁出去倒了大霉。这样的例子何止成千上万。
The damage is quite serious. From a national perspective, you see that the people are not united and are also willing to be loyal to foreigners. From an individual perspective, once you leave and live in another country, you feel like a second-class citizen. For example, some girls think that foreigners are really nice and marry them, only to find out it wasn’t so great after all. There are thousands, if not tens of thousands of such cases.

　　最近还有个例子，就是绿洲乐队演出取消。本来我对这件事情不是特别认真，只是支持下环球时报而已，事实上我都不知道绿洲乐队这些事。我没想到有这么多绿洲乐队的粉丝跳出来骂，我才觉得这个真的是个问题。就有这么些人，说他一定要去国外，然后加入国外的军队打中国。如果真的中国要跟外敌打仗的话，你说会有什么样的结果。就算是他们的音乐再好，哪有怎么了？不听能死啊？就能被外国乐队的那么几位迷成这样，就能驱使着中国歌迷这么抽风，我都怀疑绿洲乐队在英国美国这样的地方有没有这么疯狂的歌迷。

Recently, there’s been another example, which is when the Oasis concert was cancelled. Before, I didn’t really care too much about this, I was just supportive of the Global Times and didn’t really know much about the Oasis situation. However, I didn’t expect so many Oasis fans to come out and start arguing, and it seems to be a real problem. These are the types of people that would to to another countrym join their army, and attack China! If China were really to fight a war with a foreign country, can you just imagine what would happen? Even if their music was super, still, so what? Are you going to die if you don’t listen to it? I can’t understand how a foreign band can have such an effect on people and make their chinese fans go into convulsions, and I somehow doubt that Oasis fans in the UK or the US are as rabid as the ones here in China.
　　这很可怕，这肯定是跟中国这么多年逆向种族主义大环境是有关系的。这些搞逆向种族主义的知识分子，虽然没有直接介入这件事，但是绝对跟他们这么多年的教育有关系的，凭什么说我听周杰伦就是个下贱的事，听英国人的歌就是高贵的事？这帮人能听得懂那些英语歌词我都画上问号。那帮歌迷挺可怜的，他们自己本身肯定没有什么可以炫耀的，他们把这个作为自己唯一的价值所在，现在一旦受到打击便受不了。其实能听得懂又算是什么啊，又能怎么样，但是却被中国高级知识分子说成听得懂很高级，听不懂就是土鳖。我就喜欢二人转怎么了？绿洲乐队在英国皇室眼里，也就是个二人转的地位吧，为什么英国的二人转就高水平？中国的二人转就低水平？这就是这个大环境造成的。
It’s a scary thing, but it has much to do with the reverse-racism that has been going on for years. These reverse-racist intellectuals might not have been directly involved in this matter, but it has everything to do with their education and influence—why should listening to Jay Chou not be seen as somehow lower than listening to an English band? I doubt that these intellectuals can even understand the lyrics in the first place. And these poor fans, well, they probably don’t have much to be proud of themselves, so they link their self-esteem to this band, and when things like this happen, they feel slighted and injured. And so what if you can understand these lyrics, does that somehow make you better than the rest of us, who are just bumpkins? And what if I just like errenzhuan (type of dongbei/Northeastern folk performance)? TO the royal family, Oasis isn’t much more than errenzhuan, so what’s so good about them? Just the fact that they are English, which makes them good, while Chinese ones are no good? This kind of thinking is endemic to our environment.

　　至于政府为什么取消音乐会，我不知道我也不想知道。可是为了这个小事你们就抽风，就说拿枪拿炮打我们，这事值得重视。

As far as why the government decided to cancel the concert, I don’t know and I don’t particular want to know. However, if something as little as this is going to put you in convulsions to the point that you say you’re going use guns or cannons to attack us, then this is something that deserves serious attention.
　　我以前常常把文化的事情给低估了，但是看你们这么疯狂地来了，取消这件事就是对的，我现在觉得文化这件事真的很重要，我理科出身常常重视硬的科技的东西，现在看文化真的很重要。
I’ve often underestimated the importance of culture, but seeing how crazy these fans are, I think it was good to cancel the show, and now I understand that culture is important, and people like me that come out of the sciences tend to have that bias, but now I see that culture really is important.

　　传播我们的书，就是制止他们蔓延的重要一步，我为此奋斗了20多年了。我们过去没有机会出这种书，当然我们希望以后能在电视上辩论，传播效果更大，但是现在我们还没有掌握电视报纸话语权的时候，像南方报业集团，肯定不会让我们说话，这个时候，这本书起码还能代替我们传达。

Promoting this book is part of the efforts that I’ve put in over the last twenty yaars to stop people like that. In the past we didn’t have the opportunity to put out books like this, and we also hope that in future we’ll get the chance to take the debate onto television and thereby reach a wider audience, but we have yet to really develop a strong presence and voice in TV or print media, such as the Southern Newspaper group, they definitely would not let us speak our minds, so at this time, so for the time being we will just have to speak through this book.

作为一个词语“,活着”在我们 …

April 20, 09 //
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作为一个词语“,活着”在我们中国的语言里充满了力量,它的力量不是来自于喊叫,也不是来自于进攻,而是忍受,去忍受生命赋予我们的责任,去忍受现实给予我们的幸福和苦难、无聊和平庸。

This is from the preface to YU HUA’s “To Live”, and was written by the author himself. The gist of it is that “to live” is not something you shout out, or something that is aggressive, outwardly defined, but rather means to suffer and persist through both the happiness, pain, joy and grief, boredom, mediocrity and everything that life inevitably brings.

I don’t think that off the cuff translation really works, and i don’t think that the point is especially profound but it’s eloquent and that makes it worth sharing

I was just reading in the BBC Chinese ab …

April 18, 09 //
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I was just reading in the BBC Chinese about a recently released report from the Chinese govt’s national audit office, whose job it is to figure out where corrupt officials are stashing their ill gained loot. Here’s the article in its entirety, so that if you are in China and don’t have access or are too lazy to proxy you can read it right here:

中国审计署称追回270亿被挪用资金
据中国审计署的最新审计报告说，截至2008年10月底，中国各审计单位已追回或归还被挤占挪用的资金约270亿元人民币。

中国审计署在发布今年第1号审计结果时说，已有30名涉嫌违法犯罪的官员被依法逮捕、起诉或判刑，117人受到党纪政记处分。

报告说，审计发现的116起涉嫌违法犯罪案件线索已经移送纪检监察和司法机关查处，根据审计建议完善各项制度规定158项。

这次审计查出53个中央部门存在问题金额293.79亿元，已整改金额为84.42亿元。

报告说，由于违法违规操作导致国有资产流失，已收回980万元，合并账外账处理877万元。

另外，通过司法诉讼等手段正在追缴7,090万元，其余近5亿元由于责任人外逃等原因无法追回。

北京当局承认反腐是中国当前最重要的任务之一。中国国家主席胡锦涛一再警告说，腐败可能会影响中国共产党的统治。

但批评人士认为，没有开放的媒体以及独立的司法系统，中国的腐败现象不会出现根本的好转。

Some of the key points are that as of October 2008, the audit office has recovered 27 billoin RMB,30 suspected criminals have been arrested, charged or sentenced, 117 people have received Party disciplinary punishment…the rest of the article is just various figures and stats on types of missing money or where they are in the process of recovering it. Interesting one in particular: almost 500 million RMB not recoverable since the “responsible parties” have fled–most likely meaning fled the country, like that Wenzhou official in Paris that decided he was never coming back to China.

Though the BBC information was blocked, that’s just because that site is regularly GFW’d the audit report itself is not blocked and you can read it right on their official website.

Some thoughts on China’s New Human Righ …

April 17, 09 //
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Some thoughts on China’s New Human Rights Plan

So China has just recently unveiled its human rights plan, marking the first time there has been a specific plan for human rights. The document outlines the Chinese govt’s overall strategy, and for the most part, observers have been positive about this development. Southern Weekend newspaper enthusiastically noted the documents mention of the right of the media to “comment” (评论权) ostensibly giving the media more leeway to tell it like it is to power–though i think we all know what would happen if push came to shove.

I find the whole human rights discourse in china fascinating. Consider this essay from the Global Times not known for being among the more progressive of Chinese newspapers. The title of the essay reads “China’s human rights progress is not done to impress foreigners”. Meaning that their policy changes aren’t necessarily the result of pressure applied from foreign governments, especially the US and Europe–but are the natural result of the enlightened leaders and goodly people arriving at some kind of consensus about what needs to be changed and improved.

There are some interesting points made in this essay: (1) The writer remarks that only hundreds of years after the founding of the US and its constitution was Martin Luther King Jr. able to spearhead the civil rights movements that finally gave some substance to the freedoms and rights that blacks in the US were supposed to enjoy as citizens. And he/she also mentions that it was only after a century and a half after the “Declaration of the Rights of Man” and the French Revolution were French women granted suffrage. The thrust of the argument is that societies develop and change in time, and sometimes it takes a damn long time before realities catch up with the letter of the law. A society can be founded on ideals, but ideals are called ideals for a reason–they give the society something to aim for.

Therefore, the writer argues, China ought to be allowed to develop at its own pace. The conundrum modern China faces is that it has to be beholden to the Western concepts of human rights, which is a fundamentally universalist conception of human rights, while still facing the realities of life and culture and governance in China–and is that fair?

It’s quite a philosophical quandary, isn’t it–I suppose I would put it this way: the western countries have a moral obligation to comment and criticize the Chinese human rights record, because that whole obligation, and the universalist values that undergird that whole enterprise, are products of Western culture. What is great about it is the universalist aspect of it–though obviously, relativists and other people more sensitive to the marginal, non-mainstream, peripheral, sub-altern what have you will no doubt protest. I don’t mean it’s perfect, or right, but there is a certain cultural genius to it. I mean, that’s what made Jesus such a phenomenon in his time–Christianity was the first and foremost among universalist creeds. No chosen people, no goyim, no infidels. And the human rights framework stems from this.

Yet to look at it from the other side, the article says that the only human rights that really matter are the ones that the people of the country demand. Here’s the last paragraph of that article, where the author talks about this very point.

只有让中国老百姓满意的人权才是最值得中国追求的人权。中国人民在追求自己的人权目标的过程中，也为世界人权的进步做出了重大贡献。中国以自己的方式提升人权，造福本国民众福祉的决心不应受外界的影响而改变。

So obviously, this redounds to the longstanding Chinese argument that economic rights, ie the right to subsistence, is more important to China and its people than the civil and political rights that the westerners hold so dear. It’s a tricky issue–but perhaps its like Amnesty says–you really can’t have one without the other. And that is much the same as the argument made by Amartya Sen in “Development as Freedom”–which is that grassroots democracy is good for the economy, and good for economic development.

Of course, insisting on a dichotomy, or rather on the either-or of human rights, is like rooking the king from the CCP perspective, because they want to keep their rein on power and be known as the party that lead China out of poverty, and fed the people. Look at these starving, poor people–they don’t give a shit about dissent and media freedoms! They just want us to do our jobs and get them jobs so they can eat and buy homes and afford to get married and raise kids. And we do that, so you foreigners, please shut the fuck up.

So, be chary about measures like this. No standing ovation for the CCP–but I’m ready to give some lukewarm applause, no problem there. *clap….clap*

Thoughts on Jia Zhangke’s 24 City 對賈樟柯新電影《24城記》之隨想

March 21, 09 //
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Normally I prefer to write a straight up review, but in light of an unusual experience in watching film, I thought I’d make this a meta-review of sorts:

I went to watch this film at Zhongshan park in Shanghai last Tuesday. When the lights dimmed, a “documentary” about Tibet came on. As you know, this is the sensitive year for anniversaries in China, and is, in particular, the 50th anniversary of the uprising in Tibet that led to the exile of the Dalai Lama.The documentary was called, quite pointedly, “China’s Tibet, Past and Future”. If you’ve followed this issue at all, none of the information presented in this film are surprising:

*Tibet has always been part of China and the Tibetan rulers have acknowledged Chinese suzerainty since ancient times. Here are pictures and images of various historical documents that prove this point.
*WHy bother decrying the vetting of Tibetan religious leaders by China’s central government? Emperors used to do this, including with the latest Dalai Lama, so what’s the big deal if the CCP inherits this role.
*Tibet was a despotic, feudal system before the Chinese liberated it. It was a cruel theocracy of vast socio-economic inequality. The lamas and their families–the upper strata of the ancien regime–owned everything, including virtually all the arable land and other resources of production. Regular people had next to nothing.
*China liberated Tibet and gave it a good dose of progressive socialist ideology–and things improved greatly.
*Tibetan heritage is fluorishng and the standard of living has steadily improved.

It was clearly and unambiguously agitprop, but 21st. century China style, wrapping the historical narrative of Tibet up in and interweaving it with that of modern China as a whole, including the successful Beijing Olympics and the upcoming World Expo. At fifteen minutes, it was long and tendentious, and made me a bit impatient, since even after it finished, there was yet another long preview (of a regular movie), so that the film we came to watch didn’t start until a good twenty or twenty five minutes after the time stated on the ticket.

*24 City (24城記）*

Jia Zhangke has said, over the years, that he wants to alternate making docs and fiction films, and in this case he has melded the two.There are real people mixed with actors doing recreations–Joan Chen, Lv Liping, Zhao Tao, among others–but while these actors put on some decent performances these interviewees, the film doesn’t end up being more than a series of vignettes. I doubt that Jia intended to put together some systematic history of the place, but there is an unfinished, work-in-progress feel to this movie that tends to work towards its detriment. However, many of the interviews with the real people are better, because you know they are real–so here, again,is a meta-level question–how does the fact that you are watching Joan Chen change your perception of what’s being shown? It’s obvious that no matter how good Chen’s acting chops are, what she is doing is a performance. Most of the time, of course, we accept this–because that’s what makes fictional films possible in the first place–however, in this case, while Chen and the others are fine, they are still a bit actorly–and you wouldn’t really notice that fact unless you had all these more “real” performances to compare them with.

Jia is probably too intelligent not to notice this himself, but it still took me aback when he confronted this head on during the Joan Chen segment, where she says in her youth, at the prime of her beauty, her coworkers at the factory compared her to the actress Joan Chen. A little pomo joke? Maybe, but it made me a bit skittish. I suppose I still relish the suspension of disbelief,and don’t like the feeling of being taken for a ride, even if the ride, for the most part, is an enjoyable one.

That said, there are some moving moments, both from the actors and the real interviewees–enough to remind you that Jia Zhangke is one of the only Chinese filmmakers out there that can convey the gravity of China’s changing. That pathos, that uniquely Chinese pathos that glossier magazines and Western media don’t–or rather, *can’t* pick up on–are captured by Jia’s lens. One can almost forgive the lack of polish for that very reason–Jia, more than other filmmakers is continually creating audiovisual artifacts for us, the rest of the world, Chinese and non-Chinese alike–that will, I believe, stand the test of time,not only for their aesthetic excellence but because they are excellent chronicles of China. They are chronicles of physical reality, of its metamorphosis–but more than that,they are chronicles of the spirit, of what Chinese people call *jingshen*, which can mean anything mental, intellectual, spiritual–and in Jia’s case, it’s the emotional undertow, the things that are not said, that are glossed over and ignored by ideological or mainstream rhetorics that finally, as it were, get their say.

It is this kind of pathos that you don’t normally see among the audiovisual artifacts being produced today: and that’s what makes the contrast with the Tibetan propaganda film so striking. Jia was once an unofficial or underground filmmaker–and he no longer is, and he is, as well as know, no longer a skint and scrappy indie guy. He makes money. He’s got connections. But there’s still something very real, and very heartfelt at the core, and in a world of cinematic
phoniness, there’s something to be said for that stick to your guns type mentality.

To bring it back to Tibet: it is a strange juxtaposition, watching these two films together–we’re so used to seeing just previews before the movie that to see this stylish bit of agitprop is a bit startling: it hearkens back to newsreels of old, a time when the news was delivered on big screens, or when the political just had to intrude everywhere
because the world was in the throes of war or what have you. I feel obliged to mention that when we went, on Tuesday afternoon, even with the half off discount the theater was nearly empty.I highly doubt that Jia is going to make much money off this film, at least on the domestic market. Likewise, watching propaganda in the afternoon with a handful of other people didn’t quite jibe with I am sure that they play the Tibet film before the other, popular movies, so that before you settle down to watching “Transporter 3″ you get a good dose of “historical” education about the Tibet issue. Just in case things get hairy and out of control in Tibetan areas this March, or throughout the rest of this sensitive year.

China changes, or China never changes. Same ideological posture, except now in IMAX. However, Jia’s world, everything changes–and the only thing that lasts, the only thing that binds us are memories.Children are lost to their parents. Migrations, emotional rows, generation gaps all tear families asunder. The ligature of memory is strained as people get older–it seems strong when they are recalling it in front of us–but of course, we know that simply recalling something and saying it verbally doesn’t really do justice to the “strength” or “saturation” of that memory among the many memories that are stored in your brain or the salient memories constitutive of the sense of self and identity. Therefore, you get the uneasy sense that you are watching something that was unearthed quite by accident, and could very well have been lost. Maybe these “little people”, these “laobaixing” don’t mean much in the large scale of things: you read media articles with Chinese government planners, bureaucrats and energy scientists that are talking about the year 2100 like it’s tomorrow. Just about all of us who are alive now will be dead by that time, and our secrets and wounds, the maybes and could have beens–both individual and collective–will be just as gone. I’ve always been afraid that the official Chinese meta-narrative would swamp and subsume everything else–which is why it’s that much more incumbent on artists, in whatever medium, to keep recording the micro-sadnesses, vicissitudes, twists and turns, warp and woof of the individual life and consciousness. Lest it be completely be forgotten by History.

China sends “stability” teams to regional areas ahead of sensitive anniversaries

February 13, 09 //
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Just got this courtesy of a fanfou feed: the Chinese government is sending “stability” teams to local governments to help maintain social stability. Of course, as this fanfou person pointed out, this year marks several sensitive anniversaries: uprising in Lhasa, 20th anniversary of June 4th, etc. The news reports even mention how impt this year is, in particular: 今年维护国家安全和社会稳定工作面临的任务繁重而艰巨.

Pictures from Yuan Xiao Jie in Shanghai (上海元宵节及老城区夜景）

February 11, 09 //
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前天晚上去了豫园看灯会，观摩的主要是人海，但是喜气洋洋的，感觉还是不错。后来跟朋友在老城区溜达，久违的灵感也终于回来了，当然，这也跟我带新的相机出去也有关。谢谢长辈的提携以及各位朋友的支持！我要坚持拍下去！

Tech drool: the Meizu M8

February 10, 09 //
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I’d love to have an iPhone but i think that I would settle for the Meizu M8, which bears a not so uncanny resemblance to the former. The 8GB version can be obtained for about 2400 rmb, making it a bit of a better deal than a new IPhone. I found some nice picture of it and its interface on taobao.com.

Now that’s a fine looking specimen. Of course the IPhone is farther ahead in its development, especially with regards to third party apps. BUt i think that the Meizu is a fine phone as far as they go. Maybe if i get some money i will buy one of these.

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