Archives for posts with tag: history

Normally I prefer to write a straight up review, but in light of an unusual experience in watching film, I thought I’d make this a meta-review of sorts:

I went to watch this film at Zhongshan park in Shanghai last Tuesday. When the lights dimmed, a “documentary” about Tibet came on. As you know, this is the sensitive year for anniversaries in China, and is, in particular, the 50th anniversary of the uprising in Tibet that led to the exile of the Dalai Lama.The documentary was called, quite pointedly, “China’s Tibet, Past and Future”. If you’ve followed this issue at all, none of the information presented in this film are surprising:

*Tibet has always been part of China and the Tibetan rulers have acknowledged Chinese suzerainty since ancient times. Here are pictures and images of various historical documents that prove this point.
*WHy bother decrying the vetting of Tibetan religious leaders by China’s central government? Emperors used to do this, including with the latest Dalai Lama, so what’s the big deal if the CCP inherits this role.
*Tibet was a despotic, feudal system before the Chinese liberated it. It was a cruel theocracy of vast socio-economic inequality. The lamas and their families–the upper strata of the ancien regime–owned everything, including virtually all the arable land and other resources of production. Regular people had next to nothing.
*China liberated Tibet and gave it a good dose of progressive socialist ideology–and things improved greatly.
*Tibetan heritage is fluorishng and the standard of living has steadily improved.

It was clearly and unambiguously agitprop, but 21st. century China style, wrapping the historical narrative of Tibet up in and interweaving it with that of modern China as a whole, including the successful Beijing Olympics and the upcoming World Expo. At fifteen minutes, it was long and tendentious, and made me a bit impatient, since even after it finished, there was yet another long preview (of a regular movie), so that the film we came to watch didn’t start until a good twenty or twenty five minutes after the time stated on the ticket.

*24 City (24城記)*

Jia Zhangke has said, over the years, that he wants to alternate making docs and fiction films, and in this case he has melded the two.There are real people mixed with actors doing recreations–Joan Chen, Lv Liping, Zhao Tao, among others–but while these actors put on some decent performances these interviewees, the film doesn’t end up being more than a series of vignettes. I doubt that Jia intended to put together some systematic history of the place, but there is an unfinished, work-in-progress feel to this movie that tends to work towards its detriment. However, many of the interviews with the real people are better, because you know they are real–so here, again,is a meta-level question–how does the fact that you are watching Joan Chen change your perception of what’s being shown? It’s obvious that no matter how good Chen’s acting chops are, what she is doing is a performance. Most of the time, of course, we accept this–because that’s what makes fictional films possible in the first place–however, in this case, while Chen and the others are fine, they are still a bit actorly–and you wouldn’t really notice that fact unless you had all these more “real” performances to compare them with.

Jia is probably too intelligent not to notice this himself, but it still took me aback when he confronted this head on during the Joan Chen segment, where she says in her youth, at the prime of her beauty, her coworkers at the factory compared her to the actress Joan Chen. A little pomo joke? Maybe, but it made me a bit skittish. I suppose I still relish the suspension of disbelief,and don’t like the feeling of being taken for a ride, even if the ride, for the most part, is an enjoyable one.

That said, there are some moving moments, both from the actors and the real interviewees–enough to remind you that Jia Zhangke is one of the only Chinese filmmakers out there that can convey the gravity of China’s changing. That pathos, that uniquely Chinese pathos that glossier magazines and Western media don’t–or rather, *can’t* pick up on–are captured by Jia’s lens. One can almost forgive the lack of polish for that very reason–Jia, more than other filmmakers is continually creating audiovisual artifacts for us, the rest of the world, Chinese and non-Chinese alike–that will, I believe, stand the test of time,not only for their aesthetic excellence but because they are excellent chronicles of China. They are chronicles of physical reality, of its metamorphosis–but more than that,they are chronicles of the spirit, of what Chinese people call *jingshen*, which can mean anything mental, intellectual, spiritual–and in Jia’s case, it’s the emotional undertow, the things that are not said, that are glossed over and ignored by ideological or mainstream rhetorics that finally, as it were, get their say.

It is this kind of pathos that you don’t normally see among the audiovisual artifacts being produced today: and that’s what makes the contrast with the Tibetan propaganda film so striking. Jia was once an unofficial or underground filmmaker–and he no longer is, and he is, as well as know, no longer a skint and scrappy indie guy. He makes money. He’s got connections. But there’s still something very real, and very heartfelt at the core, and in a world of cinematic
phoniness, there’s something to be said for that stick to your guns type mentality.

To bring it back to Tibet: it is a strange juxtaposition, watching these two films together–we’re so used to seeing just previews before the movie that to see this stylish bit of agitprop is a bit startling: it hearkens back to newsreels of old, a time when the news was delivered on big screens, or when the political just had to intrude everywhere
because the world was in the throes of war or what have you. I feel obliged to mention that when we went, on Tuesday afternoon, even with the half off discount the theater was nearly empty.I highly doubt that Jia is going to make much money off this film, at least on the domestic market. Likewise, watching propaganda in the afternoon with a handful of other people didn’t quite jibe with I am sure that they play the Tibet film before the other, popular movies, so that before you settle down to watching “Transporter 3″ you get a good dose of “historical” education about the Tibet issue. Just in case things get hairy and out of control in Tibetan areas this March, or throughout the rest of this sensitive year.

China changes, or China never changes. Same ideological posture, except now in IMAX. However, Jia’s world, everything changes–and the only thing that lasts, the only thing that binds us are memories.Children are lost to their parents. Migrations, emotional rows, generation gaps all tear families asunder. The ligature of memory is strained as people get older–it seems strong when they are recalling it in front of us–but of course, we know that simply recalling something and saying it verbally doesn’t really do justice to the “strength” or “saturation” of that memory among the many memories that are stored in your brain or the salient memories constitutive of the sense of self and identity. Therefore, you get the uneasy sense that you are watching something that was unearthed quite by accident, and could very well have been lost. Maybe these “little people”, these “laobaixing” don’t mean much in the large scale of things: you read media articles with Chinese government planners, bureaucrats and energy scientists that are talking about the year 2100 like it’s tomorrow. Just about all of us who are alive now will be dead by that time, and our secrets and wounds, the maybes and could have beens–both individual and collective–will be just as gone. I’ve always been afraid that the official Chinese meta-narrative would swamp and subsume everything else–which is why it’s that much more incumbent on artists, in whatever medium, to keep recording the micro-sadnesses, vicissitudes, twists and turns, warp and woof of the individual life and consciousness. Lest it be completely be forgotten by History.

[spoiler alert] Kate Winslet, as well all know, has had a big year with Revolutionary Road and The Reader. Both are decent films that I really would like to cheer for, though they never seem to reach beyond the B+ range; they both just fall short of being excellent. The Reader role, was, to be sure, challenging. There wasn’t nearly enough about the “banality of evil” after you discover that Hannah (played by Winslet) was a former Nazi concentration camp guard who knowingly sent thousands of Jews to their deaths. Perhaps we don’t need to rehash these arguments or reinvestigate this psychology because of most of what is worthwhile of saying about this subject perhaps already has, in far more eloquent terms than can be managed by a mainstream movie.

As usual, Ralph Fiennes is a bit insufferable, but what can you expect, for the most part, he’s got a monopoly on these stiff upper-lip, handsome man of many secrets and mysterious past type roles. The bits with his daughter are not that moving, but then again, you know where most of the drama lies–in the parts about his youth and romance with Hanna–the rest is stocking stuffer.

The bits with the law students talking about the Nazi trials is also a bit stiff and didactic, again, maybe perhaps the subject has already been talked about ad infinitum.

Winslet’s performance is quite good, and does remind me, in a ways, of her role in Revolutionary Road–in both she’s been a woman on the verge of a nervous breakdown. It’s not surprising that Hannah commits suicide at the The Reader–was she like that character in Shawshank REdemption, that couldn’t adapt and cope with the outside world? NOt really, she never even made it out. No doubt she was afraid, but perhaps she also felt like she did not deserve to be out, to regain her freedom–as long as she was in prison, she was still, in effect, doing penance for her sins.

These characters should have no problem winning our basic sympathy, but there isn’t really much to them beyond that–I prefer characters of the mysterious, unpredictable, and beguiling type–and none of them were that.

I was just reading chapter from Richard Sennett’s book Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization, a chapter entitled “Fear of Touching”, which was about the creation of the Jewish ghetto (and whence the term originates) in renaissance Venice. It’s quite a fascinating history, and reminds us that anti Semitism has a long and varied history in Europe.

Some interesting tidbits: the Venetians of the time segregated the Jews into ghettos, and enforced a curfew on their activities, allowing them to mingle among the rest of the population during the day. However, they were forced to wear yellow when they were outside to mark their identities–and so were prostitutes/courtesans, though perhaps using a different piece of clothing. The net effect, however, was to connect, in the mind of Christian Venetians, prostitution, syphilis, moral debauchery, and Jewish otherness–with the moral and economic decay of the time. So don’t think that the Nazis were the first to make the Jews wear yellow badges and decry the moral despoilment of Christian civilization: and remember that the reason why the population of the Venetian ghettos grew so much, necessitating even more ghettos, was rooted firstly in the expulsion of Jews in 1492 and the pogroms against Jews in Germany around the same time, bringing both Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews to the prosperous port of Venice.

Another tidbit: Christians once viewed circumcision as a barbaric act of self-mutilation. And now, of course, we consider it hygienic, good for the penis, good for those that the penis touches. Of course this is no argument for moral relativism: genital “mutilation”–you have to unpack the meaning of the word, and you have to figure out just what criteria you are going to judge the whole thing with. If the practice is painful and brings to tangible health (both mental and physical) benefits to the person , and is rooted in say, the pleasures or predilections of another group altogether (i.e., husbands, men, socially elite men), then this, like foot-binding, probably should be placed in the historical dustbin.

Last thing, and that which connects this post, as promised in its title, to Gaza and the “situation” there:
here’s a passage from the end of the chapter, where Sennett talks about the pogrom of 1636, where Christian mobs went in and stole books and relics, and set fire to buildings. Sennett quotes Leon Modena, a famous Jewish rabbi and scholar of the time, who, in his old age, witnesses these tragedies and records in a melancholy vein, these events in his memoirs. Sennett sums up by saying:

In this lament, we hear a larger echo than one man’s tragedy. A group identity forged by oppression remains in the hands of the oppressor. The geography of identity means the outsider always appears as an unreal human being in the landscape–like the Icarus who fell unremarked and unmourned to his death. And yet Jews had taken root in this oppressive landscape; it had become part of themselves. It can be no reproach to say that they had internalized the oppressor in making community out of a space of oppression. But this communal life proved to be, at best, a shield rather than a sword.

This paragraph immediately reminded me of the Gaza situation as as whole. So many of the people that I have met there have never had the chance to leave the place. Some might have stepped in Israel, some might have gone to Egypt–but in general, Gaza is a large-sized ghetto. Gazans that work in Israel return, after work, to Gaza–reminding one of the Lesotho/S. African situation as well. In any case, I think it vital for humanity to think on what Sennett has summed up here in relating oppression, group identity, and the geography of isolation and oppression. Wake up, Israel: is there any wonder, given the situation in Gaza over the last forty years, that one would see the rise of Hamas, or militancy in general? And military action–bombings–of Gaza can only be predicated on the otherness of the people being bombed–their unreality as human beings. They must be reduced to niggers and gooks, terrorists, cockroaches, what have you. They cannot be allowed to say or plead, as Shylock did in The Merchant of Venice, for our common humanity–because that would just make eliminating them much more of a problem. Especially in a purported democracy with a free and open press.

“If you prick us, do we not bleed?
If you tickle us, do we not laugh?
If you poison us, do we not die?
And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?
If we are like you in the rest, we will resemble you in that.”

(from Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice)

I was reading an essay on People.com.cn about another essay:

Here is what the People essay says about the original, which was written by aguy from one Zhou Tianyong, a scholar at the Party School*:

文章总结说,由于革命胜利后,党没有从一个工作中心为阶级斗争的“革命党”转变为一个工作中心为经济建设的执政党,对怎样搞社会主义经济建设并不熟悉,学习了苏联模式,而且在资源配置方式上实行了计划经济,生产资料所有制形式上采取了一大二公的国有制、城镇集体所有制和农村人民公社社队体制,在对外关系上走了自我封闭的道路,发展上倾斜于国防工业和重工业。其结果是劳动生产效率较低,科技人员和企业没有创新和技术进步的动力来源,技术进步缓慢,投资建设浪费较大,与整个世界各国经济社会发展的差距越来越大。可以这样评价:建国后的30年里,在全球经济社会发展的竞争中,我们走了弯路,延误了时机。

Which more or less says that after the revolution, instead of working right away on building up the economy and lifting people out of poverty, China embarked on this Soviet style planned economy, heavily biased in favor of defense and other heavy industries, and closed itself off from the rest of the world. And thus, as a result, China lagged further and further behind the rest of the world economy, and so, taken that way, the first thirty years after the revolution (49-79)–in terms of the world economy (that is, being part of the system), we have taken a circuitous route and wasted very precious time.

I suppose there is nothing new in this: this is how everyone thinks about it now. I mean, what young Shanghainese person would think that being part of the capitalist world-system was bad–it’s just a matter of finding a domestic economic system that guarantees 1. standard of living rises and more people are lifted from poverty and 2. that society remains stable. Which is why, as the old nostrum goes, China is not yet ready for democracy, or rather why it should avoid radical democratization, or more precisely, emulation of those mechanisms of democracy that liberal capitalist democracies favor, ie elections.

But still, to have things change in thirty years is fairly drastic and really does give one pause. THe ideological fig leaf is rotting “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In truth everyone is just trying to steer the ship in a fairly safe and stable way. No one wants to rock the boat that much. NOt when there is this much at stake. That’s why you bailout banks and that’s why you go fro stimulus packages and that’s why you refrain from introducing elections into a country that doesn’t have that tradition in place. Of course, the problem is that we know that every choice that is made is made in the interest of someone–and that someone often believes that their interests take precedence over that of someone else–and so that is where the debate ought to come in, but that is, actually, the point of democracy. However situating that much energy and democratic energy at the grassroots level would, again, be possibly detrimental in China. Or not. Anyway while all of us debate and ponder various models of growth, our lives pass by–not to say that such ponderings are a waste, no, it’s more a reminder of how short our lives are compared to these magnificent macrohistorical backdrops that we can concoct and hold in our minds. Our minds can see the vast sweep of history, or hell, of the universe–but our bodies are obviously much more perishable.

*Party School. snicker, snicker.

These are some excerpts that I translated from the original article in Chinese.

人物周刊:现在有一个现象,就是在城郊结合部农村集体所有制的土地上,建起了很多村民建的房,一租30年,相当于商品房。许多城里人因为买不起城里的房子,会向那边流动,把外来务工者可以租住的农民房的价格又抬高了。

秦晖:对,这个是国际上贫民住房的一个非常重要的问题。实际上政府也没有驱赶穷人,但是贫民区住的人多,价格抬高,穷人住不起就都走掉了。这是市场经济带来的问题,我觉得还是要靠国家福利来解决。

NFZK: Recently there’s been a phenomenon of city people moving outwards towards the countryside, living in homes that were intended for migrant workers and peasants, raising the prices of real estate there.

Qin Hui: Yes, this is a very important international issue. It’s not that the governments are trying to drive out the poor, but when there are increasing numbers of people living in these areas, prices climb and poor people can no longer afford to live there. This is a problem that arises in a market economy, and I believe that only a social welfare system can address it.

人物周刊:您发出声音的主要对象是谁?是政府,还是大的利益集团比如房产商们?

秦晖:我的意见本质上就是约束政府权力,要政府承担责任,必须给这些进城的人解决住房。如果有能力就给他们盖廉租房,暂时没有能力至少不能撵他们走。

NFZK: Your opinions and analysis–for whose ears are they meant? Is it the government or special interest groups such as real estate developers?

Qin Hui: My opinions boil down to checks and balances on the power of the government, I want them to take the responsibility and solve the issue of housing for the urban poor and migrant workers. If they have the wherewithal, build some cheap housing, and if not, at least don’t try to drive them away.

人物周刊:作为一个城里人,您不害怕城市变得乱糟糟吗?

秦晖:当然害怕。但我们不能以这个为理由剥夺农民的权利。乱糟糟的状况,当然是要解决的,而且世界各国的贫民社区发展史已经表明,这方面有了很大进步,哈莱姆的治安就比以前好很多,它就在哥伦比亚大学旁边,八九十年代去哥大的中国学者住哈莱姆的大有人在,所以我不同意温铁军的一句话,“中国学者一到国外就都是周旋于上流社会,从来没有人去关心贫民窟。”另外他转了一圈发现贫民窟比较恐怖,所以得出的结论和南非白人政权是一样的:必须不准穷人在城里住……新农村建设如果按这个思路搞就和南非一样啊,南非搞的黑人家园就是这种制度:黑人可以在城里打工,但不要在城里安家,打工到三十几岁就该回去了。

NFZK: As a city dweller, are you afraid that the cities are going to become dangerous or experience a breakdown in social order:

Qin Hui: Of course I have those fears. But I don’t believe this is a good reason to deprive other people of their rights. This lack of order is of course something that we have to work on, and the history of slums in other countries indicates that progress can be made; consider Harlem, which is much better than before and is right next to Columbia University. The Chinese scholars that went to Columbia in the 1980s and 90s often set foot in Harlem, so I don’t agree with that Wen Tiejun said about “as soon as Chinese scholars go abroad, they only mingle with the upper crust and never care about what happens in the slums.” On the other hand, he went out to the slums and thought they were scary, and so reached a conclusion similar to that of the South African apartheid government: we can’t let poor people live in the cities…the new construction and development in the village, if it goes down that track, will end up being just like South Africa of that era, when you had Bantustans: the blacks could enter the city to work, but not live there, and after working until their 30s were told to go back to their homes.

人物周刊:这里要打个问号,他们真的好起来了吗?原来在村里一年挣几百块,进了城打工一个月就有500块,“比在老家强多了”。其实很多人在城里谋生,心里是有创伤的,但他怀着希望,要往上游走,因为整个大环境都把这个价值判断塞给他:城里一定是比农村好的。

秦晖:对,你的问号我很赞同。但这里有两个层次的问题:第一,我们所谓的好与不好以什么人的感受为依据?只能以他的感受为依据。只要这个人是健康的、没丧失理智的,那么他就是具有判断力的,这个健康不是指文化上的,若说由于文化素质差而不懂什么是好,这样讲就太不人道了,等于剥夺了穷人的选择权。

第二个层次是,他做出某种价值判断实际上隐含有某种被迫的成分,但是这种成分他没有说出来。比如有人说他进城了,尽管生活很糟糕,一大堆人挤大通铺,妻子儿女留在老家,没有家庭生活,但还是觉得好,起码比原来在农村受苦要好——他实际上有一个预期,虽然这个预期可能是虚幻的,是达不到的。

这时候有两个选择:一是因为认定他的预期是达不到的,就干脆取消他的预期,把他赶走;二是我们来分析为什么他的预期达不到。

一种可能是预期太高:他要当总统、要当大富翁,这是做不到的;另一种可能是在城里不存在公平竞争,哪怕蓝领行业的公平竞争都没有,很多行业他们是不被准入的,那就不能说他这个预期是不合理的;第三种连预期都谈不上,而是本来完全可以做到的、顺其自然的事情,由于人为的阻隔,无法实现。

比如,有些人在城里处在类似打黑工的状态,只能住工棚,没有正常的家庭生活,但他觉得挣点钱寄回家去盖房子也是好的——其实很多进城打工的人没有在城里常住的预期,他们所谓的希望就是35岁以前住工棚,35岁以后回家——如果我们想给他们指出某种希望,不是恰恰要维护他们有在贫民窟生活的权利吗?

NFZK: I think we have to raise a question here–are they really better off in the city? Before, in the villages, it would take them an entire year to earn a few hundred yuan, and now in the cities they can make 500 in a month, which is “much better than at home.” However, in some sense coming to the cities to work is quite damaging, because they come here with hopes of upward mobility, because the entire environment is feeding them these values: cities are naturally better than the countryside.

Qin Hui: Right, I agree with that. But this questions has two levels. Firstly, upon what basis do you judge what is good and bad? We can only rely on their subjective feelings. If a person is healthy and mentally stable, we can assume that they still have the ability to make such judgments, and by healthy I don’t mean educated or cultured, because if we are going to say that they don’t really understand things because they aren’t educated, well, that would just be too unfair and would be tantamount to depriving them of their right to choose.

On another level, if these value judgments are somehow based on things beyond their control, they do not always tell you so. For example, these workers come into the city, and even though their lives are difficult, with everyone crammed together, sleeping on the floor, their wives and children at home and therefore no semblance of family life, they still think it’s good, because at least it’s better than what they would have to endure at home–they actually have expectations, even though these expectations can be somewhat illusory and therefore cannot be reached.

At this point, they are confronted with two choices: one, because they are unable to meet their own expectations, they just forgo these expectations and the other is that we attempt to analyze why their expectations were not met.

One possibility is that their expectations were too high: they want to become president, they want to become rich, these are just impossible. The other possibility is that they are faced with unfair competition, because even some blue collar jobs aren’t level playing fields, in fact they are practically barred from various professions, in which case you cannot say that their expectations are not rational. The third possibility is that there was nothing inherently wrong with the level of their expectations, but because of human obstacles they are somehow unable to realize their goals.

For example, some of the people that come to the cities are working “underground”, so they can only stay in makeshift homes, and don’t have normal family lives, but they feel that remitting money home to build a house is something good–in fact, many of the migrant workers don’t harbor hopes of long-term residence in the city, they just think that before they are 35, they can live in those makeshift dorms and after they turn 35, go home–and if we really want to give them something to hope for, don’t we have to begin by safeguarding their rights in these slums?

人物周刊:户籍也好,违章建筑也好,这一道道的门槛其实是阻碍农村人向城市流动,虽然现在有几亿大军在流动。

秦晖:对啊,实质是剥夺贫民的权利。比如,违章建筑的概念实际上是非常任意的,如果非常明确地规定什么建筑是违章,什么是不违章,而且严格执行,那很可能把城里人也给赶走了。但城里人你是不可能把他赶走的,因为他有城市户口,哪怕他住在狗窝里也不能赶他走,所以这个制度就有了很大的弹性。可是,把外来务工者赶走的理由往往是私设摊点、私搭乱建,并不是说他没有城市户口。

NFZK: Whether it’s the hukou system or the illegal housing issue, these end up just being obstacles thrown up to prevent greater influx of migrant workers into the city, even though there are already hundreds of millions of these people on the move.

Qin Hui: Exactly, these are just ways of depriving poor people of their rights. For example, the illegal housing concept is somewhat arbitrary, if they had an unambiguous definition of what is legal and what is not, and upheld the letter of the law, they might end up kicking out a bunch of urban dwellers. But you can’t kick out the urban dwellers, because they have a city hukou, and even if they live in a dog house you wouldn’t be able to expel them from the city, and so you can see this system’s flexibility. However, one of the main reasons for expelling migrants are the private markets and stalls they set up, or the haphazard houses being thrown up, not because they don’t have a city hukou.

秦晖:前几年讨论民族主义的时候,有人说西方的民主很虚伪,比如看起来对黑人多好,其实白人心里还是很歧视黑人的。已故的何家栋先生就写了一篇文章,提出伪善和伪恶的概念。他说,对,其实西方很多白人心里是看不起黑人的,但行为上他们必须对黑人非常尊重,说这是虚伪也可以,但这种虚伪是一大进步;“文革” 时,很多人其实是很同情“牛鬼蛇神”的,心里并不认为他们是坏人,但必须表现出一种对他们的歧视甚至仇恨,上去踢两脚打两拳,否则就可能受到责难和迫害,这就很糟糕了。

我认为一个社会应该有伪善机制,因为人性总是不尽善的。荀子很早就说过“人性本恶,善者为也”,善都是装出来的,你可以说他是提出了伪善的概念,但如果社会有一种机制,让好人能做好事,坏人至少不做坏事,或被迫做一些好事,那当然是有积极意义的。应该避免一种机制,使人表现得比他心里想的更坏。

Qin Hui: A few years ago, some people were discussing democracy and saying that western democracies were in fact hypocritical, for example because it seems that they treat black people well but in fact white people still, in their hearts, look down on black people. As a consequence, people like He Jiadong wrote an essay about hypocritical values of good and bad, and said that even though many white people still look down on white people, they still had to treat black people with respect, and you can call that hypocritical if you want, but such hypocrisy is still a sign of progress: during the Cultural Revolution, many people believed in the “ox spirits and snake gods”, didn’t think they were bad people, but had to publicly express a form of hatred or discrimination towards them by kicking and punching them, for otherwise they would receive condemnation themselves, which is really terrible.

I believe that society ought to have a mechanism for producing or encouraging such “hypocritical” goodness, because human nature is not perfectly good. Xun Tze said that people are by nature evil, but can learn to act good, so you could say that he was the first to propose this concept of hypocritical good, but if society had a mechanism for such a thing, to let good people do good things and let bad people not do too much damage, or be forced to do some good things, this would still be a positive thing. What we should avoid is a system where there are more evil actions in actuality than exists in the heart.

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I looked up the word “flaneur” in the index of hte boojks and skipped straight to it: I’d heard this term first in books by and about Walter Benjamin, and the idea of these urban wanderers–poets, wastrels, misfits, outsiders, rebels–was always appealing to me. The rich cultural life of Paris in the 19th c. cannot be understood without the historical context in mind, meaning the incredible, mind-boggling political tumult of that century. Dotted with revolutions and restorations, burgeoning capitalism and urban planning, riots, battles, and all out international war, many of the figures of this century are larger than life, in a way that somehow, in my mind at least, exceeds those of the last century.

Regarding the flaneurs: Here’s a passage from the book:

One of the new pleasures avaialble to those city-dwelling bohemiens, who, like Gautier, sought the strange, the uncanny, the poetic and the mysterious that lay around them, was the art of wandering pointlessly through the city. This activity, termed flanerie — a word that dated back to the sixteenth century and which had originally been used to mean ‘wander’ or ‘drift’ — was already apparent in the seventeenth century…

The author then talks about Balzac and Baudelaire as flaneurs par excellence: and of course this had to do with the hugely transformative nature of Haussman’s new design for Paris…the urban landscape changed, opening up new potentialities for how people interacted with physical urban space and how that urban space constrained and made possible new forms of (collective) social interaction. Back to flanerie: there are times when I wonder whether or not street photography for me, is at base, just a form of flanerie. I believe the spirit and impulse is the same, at least in the way that in lives in me. There’s another telling phrase in the book: the flaneur is always “detached from hte pleasures that he observes and takes part in.” That phrase was perhaps more striking than anything else I had read about the flaneurs. Because the stock definition leaves you thinking that a flaneur is a kind of hippie, dandy type person that believes in creativity and art, not 9-5, pensions and mortgages. Their lives and their art–if, that is, amidst all the debauchery they could sustain the effort it takes to make lasting art–were conjoined and were, to put it a bit too crudely, a fart in the face of the bourgeoisie. However ephemeral it was, there is something eternal about that, but at least to we who have come into the world so much later. Sure, we all love cities, but the fascination must have been different for them, for modern urban planning, and that entire ethos of rationalist, scientific, Enlightenment progress was gathering steam and changing things in a way that we could not have imagined. They were at the brutal front lines of that epochal shift in human history.

Sure we have our own epochal changes: the rise of megacities, the BosWash thing, southern CA, the Pearl River Delta Region, Lagos, Mumbai: all of this suggest that flanerie ought to be alive and well. Though we might be well-advised to engage in flanerie from within the safe confines of a bullet-proof SUV, where we can cautiously gawk at people, our glances and stares masked by a tinted window.

Maybe this is how we ought to describe urban rappers (and I mean Tribe Called Quest, not Ice Cube or 50 cent) and street photographers. There is, in their respective mediums, a restless search for something in the streets, the nooks and crannies, desolate parking lots and anonymous malls, parks with their anodyne family sculptures, etc.

Street photography is attached, via some unseen umbilical cord, to my visual hunger for a place. A new city offers that kind enticement and that kind of fascination. The city itself might not be inherently beautiful or unique, but I am just fascinated by the fact that I have not seen it before. There is copious room for investigation, which you do with your feet, mostly, and your eyes. And the camera is almost ancillary, it just becomes a capture too, albeit one that you try to use artistically and intentionally with the hopes of some aesthetically pleasing result. Unfortunately, I realize now, after years and years in Shanghai, that I thrive on this kind of stimulation, you could even say I’m addicted to it–and that must explain why I am constantly on websites, looking up travel deals and checking airplane ticket prices and planning in my mind the next great escape.

Traveling and wandering seem, to me, much more “natural” a mode to be in. I think it might just be this heightened aversion to boredom, this constant thirst to see things, explore. There is a phrase in this book or perhaps somewhere else, that springs to mind: “reservoir of electricity”–I think many people who come to Shanghai feel this kind of “buzz”, this ineffable quality that somehow swims above and around and can’t quite be expressed by economic indicators. Even when markets take a dive: there’s still that buzz, that creative license to follow your own gods, make your own identity, shape your own destiny. That’s a romantic view of Shanghai, no doubt, and it’s very subjective because half of the time I don’t feel it at all; I think that this place is hopelessly crummy and inferior, very noveau-riche. Sometimes it feels like everyone is a benighted bumpkin and other times they strike me as arrogant parvenus. And sometimes they just appear as regular people getting on with their lives. Of course, it’s not that they are in someway chameleonic, this is just, in psychobabble terms, what I am projecting of myself onto them.

Cafe life’s intimate connection with politics, satire, revolution, literature, cabaret and general licentiousness in Paris is fascinating for me. What do the sociologists call it? The third space? Well it was alive and kicking in the Paris of the 19th century. I don’t know if I feel any electricity anymore, anywhere: in Paris there were cafes that were popular with journalists and actors, while other groups flocked to other places. This milieu was actually many micro-milieus, niches, and I don’t know if anything analogous really exists here in Shanghai. I keep thinking it must because it is, or ought to be in my mind, some kind of invariant of human social life. These are niches that you bury yourself in, and by doing so embed yourself in history, live history, not outside it. And somehow that is connected to the idea of authentic living, or just really living. Because although we all live in history most of the time it seems to me to be more like a truck whizzing by you very fast that you have to jump out of the way for lest you get flattened by it. The flaneurs are somehow removed the pleasures they observe and indulge in. They are participant-observers. Some of them are quintessential outsiders (in Colin Wilson’s sense of the word).

In any case, as exciting as it is to read about these things, there is always the collateral cost of reading any kind of history: the heightened sense of ephemerality of things, and the analytical impasse that the mind comes to when it reaches beyond the author’s guidance. That is to say, when you take the author’s writings and analysis as a point of departure for your own thoughts about that period in history or worse yet, meta-reflections in history itself, you feel disoriented, lost. You don’t have the moorings that historical facts (or what we take for fact at present) give you. There’s the Faustian hope that if you know enough, you will have solved the problems and saved your own soul, but you’ve got a sneaking suspicion that this is just flat out impossible. For example, what can we extrapolate about France and the French from its illustrious 19th century cultural history? So many of the great writers, novelists, poets, intellectuals, and painters of the world all walked the earth at this time, and to be specific, walked the boulevards and alleyways of Paris. That’s just plain anomalistic by any standards, and reminds of me that famous line from Carol Reed’s The Third Man, where Harry Lime (Orson Welles) says to Holly Martins that the tumultuous years under the Borgias produced Michelangelo and the Renaissance greats, while 500 years of peace and democracy in Switzerland produced…the cuckoo clock. It’s a great monologue, for one, but it does make one think about how these unusual and intense bursts of cultural activity happen…highly nonlinear for sure.

More as I come up with more…if anyone is even reading…

Something’s been running around my mind since I started reading this book: the idea of the scholar-painter. Each of the early Chinese dynasties had court painters, but its during the first centuries AD, after the fall of the Han and during the successive Wei, Jin, Tang, Song, Five Dynasties that you have individual “artists” emerging, and then you have the idea that they are not just painters, but men of letters, scholars — you see it in the development, during the Song and Yuan and afterwards, of paintings that have poems written on them. The written word and the image are, thereafter, wed both in art and artist. It seems that they loved to sing and play various instruments as well.

Jiang Xun mentions that now familiar trope in Chinese high culture: the men of letters that go into seclusion, the wandering (and often drunk) poets, they of considerable talent who, for whatever reason, refuse their services to the new regime, preferring the consolations of nature and poetry.

What follows next might alienate some people (if, that is, anyone is actually reading this): I sometimes think of myself in this light. I might not be completely fit for that lifestyle, but given my druthers I would spend more time wandering, and more time writing than I do now … the parallel interests in writing, poetry, painting and music also seem to describe me. Of course, related to this apposition of various arts is the spiritual crisis or drama of alienation: of course these poets from a millennium ago could not really have experienced the anomie and alienation of we moderns: but there is, of course, much we have in common with them as well, perhaps a certain intellectual aloofness and even disdain from both masses and elites. They are not one with them. They are not for these types of games. They want an exit strategy from the mess, an escape route that can instantly take them far from the madding crowd.

In times of great turmoil or rapid social change, their ontological security is in our intellectual/artistic lineage, our belief that we are part of a loose collection of individuals and groups over human history that have shared this particular orientation. Outsiders, to use Colin Wilson’s concept anachronistically. They offer succor and sustenance to each other, through the centuries.

Grandiose, perhaps. Pompous, arrogant, poncey, overwrought, etc. It’s nothing I use to puff my ego up, to big myself. It’s just a small thought that somehow, for whatever reason I mean, gets me through the day a little easier and gives much-needed rest to the frazzled neurons that are, like those myriad background processes in any computer operating system, constantly eating up my mental and spiritual resources, insidiously and invisibly making the task of making it through the day just that much harder.

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Hua died on August 20, and as you can expect w/ someone of his particular stature and role in history, obituaries are going to be terse at best:
On Baidu news, the Olympics coverage dominated most of the top of the web page, and you had to scroll down slightly to get to a few sparse links, as you can see from the image below:

Not that many articles went in depth into who Hua was or what he did, and none of them really were obituaries except perhaps this one. Most of them were, like this one, made note of his passing and threw a timeline of his career in there, which is nice as a reference though totally useless in terms of explaining to the uninitiated what this guy was all about.

THe news of the Communist Party of China website had the following article:

This article talks about Hua’s career, mostly with regards to his role in the “smashing of the Gang of Four,” duly noted as a positive political accomplishment, whereas his “two whatevers” policy, based on the unabashed obeisance to the gospel of the Chairman, was considered, in hindsight, to be a political “error.”

I can’t help but smirk a bit at reading the translation of 两个凡是 as the “two whatevers” because whenever I hear the word “whatevers” I hear some southern Californian moppet intoning the word with a roll of the eyes.

I’m going to keep track of what the Chinese media has to say about Hua, if anything, in the coming days and weeks.

The original article mentions that these terracotta warrior lights feature more than just the traditional warriors—there are also pregnant women and children, done in a similar style. There are 102 of them and will be displayed at some plaza whose English name I don’t know, but in Chinese it’s 世贸天阶奥运文化广场.

Following my general trend of unflinching negativity that flies in the face of all that is good, pure, noble, and sweet in the world, my thoughts on these lights are: c’est de la merde.

But who knows? Maybe if I saw them in person, lit up at night, I’d find it pretty cool.

This Xinhua article comes up with some interesting statistics: in the last 300 years, there were 50 natural disasters that claimed over 100,000 lives, and of those, 26 were in China, with the total number of dead numbering 103 million, 68% of the total amount.

Over 1/10 of the earthquakes happen in China, as well as typhoons, droughts, etc.

So the article then delves into the issue of insurance…specifically natural disaster insurance. The problem, as with anything in China, if is there a legal system that can support it, and then of course come the issues of the particular insurance models that will spring up to compete for the buyer’s money. But this article calls for the government to make haste in setting up the proper legal protocols so that instead of just having the government and the victims “split” the costs of the damages, a third-party–the insurance companies–start playing a part. The article cites 9-11 as an example…

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